Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: It's been troubling me for the better part of the last half century. Why? Because we knew in advance that Syria and Egypt were going to attack Israel. It was a coordinated, planned surprise invasion. We knew it days in advance.
We knew it definitively.
I realized that the Israelis were caught with their pants down. Theres nothing more un american than to have secret cabal within the us intelligence agencies that work against stated public american policy. And thats what they did.
They corrupted the intelligence that we had and allowed the Israelis to be duped.
[00:01:03] Speaker B: Well, the world has been watching with rapt attention as all the players of the Middle east take their place on the world stage. With Iran and Hezbollah breathing ominous threats to retaliate for the targeted killings of two terror leaders, everyone in the region is anticipating or was anticipating a massive strike on Israel.
It's been weeks now and the threats seem to have fizzled. After soaring to record levels of alerts and tension, nothing happened and the proverbial Gull coast kept moving. You could say that Iran's seeming to stand down has to do with deterrence, led greatly by Israel's primary ally, the United States. In response to the iranian threats, the United States beefed up its military in the region with an extra 8000 troops, naval carriers, and us fighter jets. The State Department announced a $20 billion weapons shipment to Israel this week as well. Not that the weapons will get there this quickly, but at least they approved the package.
But this type of support hasn't always seemed so certain. Certain under the Biden administration, at least not in the past few months. While Israel had all of the world's support after Hamas's brutal massacres on October 7, the sympathy quickly waned as Israel began retaliating with strikes on Gaza, leveling entire neighborhoods and killing tens of thousands, both Hamas operatives and civilians alike.
President Joe Biden even said at some point on a hot mic that he and israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu needed to have a come to Jesus meeting. Biden also questioned Israel's insistence on a military incursion of Rafa, the southernmost city of Gaza on the egyptian border. The US also pushed for a ceasefire, which was contrary to the Netanyahu government's position.
Many Israelis felt that the Biden administration had been undermining Israel during this war, and one person said that that's actually par for the course. Bruce Brill is a former NSA analyst and author of deceit of an ally, a memoir of military antisemitism, NSA's secret jew room and Yom Kippur war treachery you know, it was exactly 50 years between the October 7 Hamas invasion that Israel was surprised by another war. They call it the Yom Kippur war.
It also happened on a holiday just like October 7, and took Israel seemingly by surprise. 50 years ago, Bruce was at NSA, and he says in his book that us intelligence knew days in advance of syrian and egyptian plans for the 1973 Yom Kippur invasion of Israel, but they didn't tell Israel. So is the same thing happening today? Is that what's at play with the US State Department? Well, let's get right to today's conversation with Bruce Brill, who says that perhaps what was the case 50 years ago is also the case today.
[00:04:22] Speaker C: Welcome to the Inside School of Jerusalem today. Thank you so much for your time.
I want to know, first of all, how long were you in the NSA? And I understand that you became a specialist in Arabic and Hebrew, actually, back then in the US. So just tell me a little bit about your time in the NSA and what you did.
[00:04:45] Speaker A: Okay, well, I was actually only in the NSA.
I said the NSA. I was in NSA long enough not to say I was in the NSA because people at work there never said the. Nice to know, getting back to answering your question, just a couple years, because I enlisted in the army for four years. They gave us a year early out, and the first year was basic training, security training and language training.
And so there were only a couple years that I actually spent working as an analyst in NSA.
But they were critical years. They were 72 through 74. And during that period was the 1973 Yom Kippur war, or as the Arabs prefer to call it, the October war.
[00:05:48] Speaker C: Ah, okay. And yet here we are again, sitting with another October war, which is very interesting.
[00:05:55] Speaker A: Another October war with many, many similarities.
[00:05:59] Speaker C: Yeah. And I really want to get to those. But tell me now, your book, deceit of an ally has to do with the Yom Kippur or the October war. There it is.
And what about it? Now? This is. I mean, what. What I've read is, it's pretty scandalous.
So tell us about it.
[00:06:23] Speaker A: Okay.
Well, it's been troubling me for the better part of the last half century. Why? Because we in G six. G six was that section of NSA that dealt with the Middle east.
We knew in advance that Syria and Egypt were going to attack Israel. It was a coordinated, planned surprise invasion.
We knew it days in advance.
We knew it definitively.
And on the first day of the war, when I was working, monitoring live communication from the battlefront, I realized that the Israelis were caught with their pants down, which troubled me because we knew definitively days in advance, how did we not get this critical intelligence to our ally?
I didn't know the answer at that moment, but I just knew that we didn't get the critical intelligence to our ally. Troubled me for 50 years.
[00:07:45] Speaker C: Yeah, and why? But why not? Because that sounds like, I mean, it's a major allegation, and it's not something that even Israelis talk about today. So what did you know?
And by the way, I mean, is this something like with you saying this information? Are you threatened or you like.
Anyway, go ahead.
[00:08:09] Speaker A: The reason that Israelis don't talk about it is because they don't know the answer. There were over 1300 books written on the Yom Kippur war, but not one of them discloses the truth behind the success of the arab surprise attack. Not one of them, except this one.
That's why Israelis don't talk about it. But they are obsessed with it. They want to know, as a matter of fact, when October 7 happened in this past year, nine months ago, all of them, all the Israelis were saying, it sounds so similar to what happened on October 6, 50 years before, almost to the day.
They're troubled by it because they sense something needs to be disclosed.
[00:09:17] Speaker C: Okay. And what, see, like, now, it's really interesting because we're looking at, you know, from October 7 now, all of the reports are coming out that even israeli agencies had the information about the Hamas attacks.
[00:09:36] Speaker A: Look, in 73 israeli intelligence agencies knew almost definitively that Syria and Egypt were going to attack imminently. They knew this on October 4 and October 5.
Why didn't they act? It's disclosed in my book. I wanted to find out why they didnt act on their own intelligence. So I picked up a phone six years ago when Elie Zaira, General Elie Zaira, the head of Israel military intelligence, was almost 90 years old. And I thought to myself, the answer to the question lies with this man.
And I picked up a phone and he invited me to his home.
And it was six years ago, July 4.
July 4. And then he invited me again to his home. And he disclosed to me, he confided in me that he received military intelligence assessments from his american colleagues.
Don't pay attention to your own intelligence. The Arabs are not going to attack.
This is what he confided in me. So I made a write up of this because it sounds explosive. And I went to Haaretz. It's Israeli's daily renown. Daily.
[00:11:22] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:11:23] Speaker A: And I went to the editor and I submitted this explosive disclosure, and that's exactly what he said. This is explosive. Did you record him?
I said, no. He said, did you have a witness?
I said, no. He said, nobody is going to believe you.
[00:11:45] Speaker C: Right.
[00:11:45] Speaker A: But subsequent to that and subsequent to my book getting approval from the Pentagon to publish it.
Approval to publish it? Given that I redact certain sections from the book, and so the book is full of redactions under two conditions. One, that I redact what they require, for instance.
[00:12:19] Speaker C: Oh, my gosh.
[00:12:21] Speaker A: For instance, that's the biggest redaction. And the other is that I don't add one word of new content. But subsequent to my getting approval, a protocol came out of the Israel Defense forces archives on June 6, 2022, that Moshe Dayan got intelligence assessments from the Americans.
You're sitting down. 12 hours before the attack began. 12 hours before the attack began, that the Syrians and Egyptians would not be attacking.
Completely confirming. Completely confirming what Elie Zaira confided in me.
[00:13:19] Speaker C: That, okay, I mean, that that's.
That's crazy. That they would, that that would be the case. But now, at the same time, the Israelis are renowned for their intelligence, so why would they then say, oh, I guess we're wrong? So let's listen to what the Americans are saying, okay.
[00:13:44] Speaker A: It was known to Elie Zaira, who worked in the Pentagon for, I believe, like two and a half years before he assumed the role of head of israeli military intelligence, that he knew that american intelligence resources were above and beyond what Israel's intelligence resources were capable of.
And so he relied on the american assessment smartly. Smartly. I'll give you an example.
At the beginning of my investigating this whole story, I got in touch with a man who was the pioneer of using drone overflights to gather intelligence. He was the israeli pioneer. He began this in the late 1960s and into and through the 1970s.
What did he do? He took american toy planes, and he affixed cameras to them, and he sent them over the Suez Canal to photograph egyptian military installations.
Wonderful. How far could they go? Maybe a couple hundred yards over the Suez Canal and then come back.
What were we capable of doing? At the same time, in NSA, I personally saw satellite photographs of an israeli army base in the Sinai in which I could read the name of the soldier off of his kippah.
And we had wasn't 200 meters over the Suez Canal. It was the entire area. Whatever we wanted to see, we could see.
[00:15:45] Speaker C: Oh, my goodness.
[00:15:46] Speaker A: So it was smart of Elie Zahira to rely on american resources over his own.
[00:15:54] Speaker C: Okay, okay. But now, I mean, this brings up the real question, like, why, if this is the case, why would the US withhold information from Israel about an imminent attack?
[00:16:09] Speaker A: Okay, it wasn't the US.
It wasn't the US. You can see behind me, perhaps I have an american flag on my wall. That american flag was flying outside my front door from July 4 on.
I'm a proud and patriotic American. I wouldn't have enlisted in the army during the Vietnam war for four years if I weren't a patriotic American.
So it wasn't America that duped Israel.
It was secret cabal within the intelligence agencies.
And John Loftus, in his book, the secret War against the Jews, goes into detail about what is known as the jew room, where they work against Israel. Jews are not only not allowed admittance to these rooms, but they're not even allowed to know that they exist. So how did I, a jew, find out about the jew room while I was working there? That's a story. You can read about it in my book.
[00:17:30] Speaker C: Okay, all right, so we won't spoil that. But tell me, this is something. Now, is this room, is it, like, for anti jewish, anti semitic? Like, what is it? What does it mean?
[00:17:47] Speaker A: Okay, I'll tell you.
I mean, I'll tell you. Not because I was a member of it, and I know. Exactly, but other people that John Loftus interviewed were members of the jew room.
[00:18:01] Speaker C: Okay?
[00:18:02] Speaker A: So he says, first of all, that it's a misnomer because Jews are not allowed to even know that they exist. And it's not one singular room, it's rooms plural. And they not only. And you touched on it without even realizing it, they not only work against Israel, but they work against even american Jews, including me. So how did I find out about it? I mean, that's a story unto itself.
[00:18:32] Speaker C: That's why you got to buy the book.
[00:18:34] Speaker A: Okay, listen, also, you see that flag up above me? I love America. There's nothing more un american than to have secret cabal within the us intelligence agencies that work against stated public american policy. And that's what they did.
They corrupted the intelligence that we had and allowed the Israelis to be duped.
And these are taxpayer funded, unmonitorable rooms within the intelligence community. Perhaps the president of the United States, Richard Nixon at the time, perhaps he didn't know about the existence of the jew room.
Whether it exists today or not was a question that troubled me. Even in 1993 and 94, 20 years after the Yom Kippur war, I took it upon myself. Take a deep breath. And I wrote a letter to the chief of security of NSA in 93 and in 94, asking, does the policy of maintaining rooms that are off limits to Jews, does that still exist?
And in both cases, 93 and 94, I got no reply, which I think is a reply.
[00:20:10] Speaker C: I mean, why not just deny that they exist at all, right?
[00:20:16] Speaker A: I don't think he could deny, because John Loftus came out with his book two years hence, in 96, in which he documents that the jew room was still in force and still operating. So, as a good american, I went to my congressman of several years ago when I was writing the book, and says, does the jew room still exist?
And he said that he inquired, and his sources in Washington, DC said that the jew room no longer exists, that it was dismantled.
[00:20:54] Speaker C: Okay.
[00:20:55] Speaker A: So I went back to him and I said, okay, that shows that it did exist. That's kind of confirmation that it did exist. And number two, when was it dismantled? And number two, I'm not from the state that I have residence in. I'm from Missouri. Show me. Prove to me that the jew room, or some entity with another name that does the same thing does not exist today.
And of course, he couldn't. No one can.
No one can, because it's buried deep within the intelligence community.
[00:21:43] Speaker C: Okay, well, if. So, if it doesn't exist today, or even if it does, it seems like what caught my attention specifically about this is that whether or not it's considered a room today, it does seem analysts will say that there are certain, like, the State Department, for instance, will have, like, a different policy than other government agencies regarding Israel. And it's, you know, since October 7, the attacks here in Israel, there's been a back and forth with, well, the Americans are a strong ally, or the Americans are pressuring us. You know, like Israel is saying, either that the Americans are strong israeli ally, the best, the best friend we have, and then at times, they're saying that the administration is pressuring us to do this or not allowing us to enter Rafa or to, you know, or pressuring us to have a two state solution. So has it. Do you still see this subversive policymaking going on in the american government vis a vis Israel?
[00:23:00] Speaker A: The. I don't know if you heard the term frenemy.
Yes, I think that defines. Right? It defines our relationship with the United States. The United States is not one entity. It's not like one individual. It's made up of so many different bodies. The State Department is known. It's traditionally anti Israel. From the inception of the state till today. And sometimes you can have a White House, like a Trump White House that's extremely pro Israel. But it has to work against the State Department's druthers and the intelligence community also. It's not one entity. Most of the folks working in NSA are very pro Israel.
But at the time that I worked there, middle management was anti Israel.
I not only sensed it, I was a victim of it. And I talk about that in my book, too. I won't bore your listeners with that detail, but NSA is also not one body.
There are. Most of the people are pro Israel, but you get a bad guy in the right place at the right time, or should I say the wrong place at the right time, and they could do a lot of damage, like they did in 73 and maybe like what they're doing today.
Because if you ask me, I would say, certainly NSA knew about the October 7 horror in advance, I would guess because I know the resources. I mean, we knew that there would be a terrorist attack in Moscow, and we let the Russians know. We knew that the Russians were going to invade the Ukraine days before we knew that the Iranians were going to be sending missiles Israel's way. We see. I'm still saying, like, as if I'm part of the NSV, NSA.
NSA has tremendous resources. I would be very surprised if they didn't know about October 7, because we did know about October 6, 50 years ago. I'm living proof of that.
[00:25:32] Speaker C: And again, on a holiday, I mean, you know, the 73 was on Yom Kippur, which is the holiest and most observed day on the jewish calendar. And then October 7 landed not just on a shabbat, but on Simchatura, the end of the wrapping up of all the fall holidays, the end of Sukkot.
You know, most people, nothing aware now, but these. So I would say, like, since 73, things have changed a little bit because Israel now has phenomenal intelligence capabilities. I mean, arguably, arguably some of the best, if not the best, right? I don't. You know, I would think, and even, like with the israeli media, what's coming out is not that the Americans failed to tell us, but it's that.
That the israeli authorities failed to listen to their own intelligence and their own officers, from low level to high level, and civilians that were noticing things happening across the border. And even Egypt said that they warned Israel beforehand. So now it looks to be Israel that may have failed to recognize or to listen to its own intelligence rather than the Americans trying to hide it. In this case, I don't know if you have any insights into the american role pre October 7, 2023, I have zero insights.
[00:27:08] Speaker A: I've heard all the conspiracy theories, and some of them sound very logical. But of course, from my point of view, I have a prototype that the Americans knew, that they passed misinformation to the Israelis that convinced critical people in critical positions at a critical moment.
And so my thought, of course, is that the prototype from 50 years ago could very well have happened this past year.
But I can't speak to that. And I won't venture guessing or proposing some kind of hypothesis. It's just obviously, that's what someone like me would be thinking.
[00:28:05] Speaker C: Wow. Do you. I mean, this, what you're talking about, sounds like it would be headline news, right? So you're revealing this. You've got think if you have permission to reveal it from the Pentagon. Do you get threats? Do you get, like, have you been threatened? Have you been, like, told to be silent or.
[00:28:32] Speaker A: Okay, I actually begin my book by talking about a warning that Rachavamze Evi, General Rachavamza evi gave me way back in the nineties, when I didn't know for sure that the american intelligence passed misinformation to the Israelis. All I knew was that we in american intelligence definitely knew days in advance, as I said, without a doubt, that they would.
Egypt and Syria would be attacking, and people found that at that time to be explosive, forgetting about the fact that american intelligence passed misinformation to the Israelis. Okay, that was explosive. And Rahavamza Ebbe said, you, if you publish this, you are putting your life in jeopardy.
And he, several years subsequent to his warning to me, was assassinated.
[00:29:45] Speaker C: Interesting. Yes, he was. That's right.
[00:29:48] Speaker A: Yes, I've been paranoid about this. And, boy, did I take a deep breath before I sent my manuscript to the Pentagon. I felt like I was walking into the lion's den. But here again, here again, America is not one entity that's either good or bad.
When I was in touch with the people in the pre publication office of the Pentagon, the reviewers were very professional, and they did a good job, and they asked me for my review of their review, and I told them I felt like I was walking into the lion's den when I sent you my manuscript, because I'm disclosing all these very, very, very sensitive things that were super top secret or would seem to be super top secret. And I said, as I felt like Daniel walking into the lion's den, the lady who was the coordinator of the review was like, daniel's angel who came down from heaven.
And the head of the review department wrote me back an email, and he said, mister Brillenne, we have never gotten such a positive review of our reviews.
So there are good people in the Pentagon that allowed me to publish my book. So even though I was paranoid before and during their review, after they gave approval, I felt relaxed, and I don't feel fear.
[00:31:45] Speaker C: Okay, well, tell me something. What would. What do you want people? Like, let's say this is in the past.
You know, this happened in 73. We don't know if it's happening today. What do you want people to take from this book, from the knowledge of this, both Israelis and Americans?
[00:32:06] Speaker A: Okay.
I feel guilty that I didn't somehow get my book, and here's a hebrew version, it was translated into Hebrew, that I didn't get it out in time. And I'm not a very good marketing person. I didn't meet with the Kevin Tuttles of the world at the time. But I always fear that had I gotten it out in a serious and successful way so that my story could have gotten to israeli intelligence officials before October 7, that it might have prevented October 7. And so what do I want today? To come out of my book. I'm not looking to be a bestseller, although that wouldn't hurt. I'm looking to prevent future October sevenths. And this is what Hamas has promised, that October 7 was just the first. There will be many, many more October sevenths. And if the reason that October 7, the intelligence failure, was successful from the point of view of the Arabs, then if I could prevent that by getting my disclosures out and into the consciousness of the Israelis that are in charge of their intelligence, then we've accomplished something noble. And you're part of it.
[00:33:44] Speaker C: Let's hope. Now, let me ask you, do you see any other intelligence lapses happening? You've got Hezbollah still threatening in the north. You've got Yemen, the Houthis in Yemen, and you've got Iran and all their I on the border.
[00:34:02] Speaker A: I just gave a musical performance Friday up at a Moshav Kakal. It's up in the Galio, not far from Tiberias. It's about a 2025 minutes ride north ish of Tiberias. And while I was there yesterday, getting ready to come back home, there were 17 missiles and drones and rockets that were shot out of the skies not far from there. And my host, who went to Tel Aviv, and I went with her to Tel Aviv, drove back. There were two missiles that hit the road right near where she was driving home. She said she was a five minute drive from her home. And two missiles hit the ground, one on the left side of the road and one on the right side of the road. So what are they trying to do?
We know that they have over 150,000 such missiles and rockets and whatnot.
Testing the waters. They're seeing what kind of response. They're gathering data so that when push comes to shove, they will be better prepared to know how to fire their missiles and rockets and in what quantity, barrage and to where and to see and understand what kind of response the Israelis can offer.
[00:35:52] Speaker C: Interesting. Okay. And this we're seeing play out not as surprising, but I wonder if there are any, like, at the moment, it's just attrition rather than any big surprise. But I wonder if there is another surprise that awaits, which would be in light of 73 and in light of now, again in 2023. 2023.
This is seems to some major wars. Israel's two major wars probably were both surprises.
So. Well, this is very interesting. I also, I do want to ask you about Jonathan Pollard as well, because now I would say that in your book, at first, you weren't on his side necessarily in the beginning, right?
[00:36:48] Speaker A: Not at all. I mean, I was a loyal american serviceman who worked in intelligence. And when you do that, you take a secrecy oath.
You don't share the intelligence with any foreign national. And so at first, when I saw that he did precisely that, I said, why should I be in support of someone like that who violated his secrecy oath? But when I studied his situation more thoroughly, I understood that he was actually should be recognized not only as a courageous Jew or Israeli, but as a brave American. Why? Because he saw that his supervisors were suppressing vital intelligence, or intelligence that he thought was vital to the Israelis. And if you read his father in law's book, Bernard Henderson, it's so clear that Pollard was Jew baited at the time, that he was working in naval intelligence. And so he took it upon himself to do what his supervisors should have been doing, passing vital information to an ally.
[00:38:13] Speaker C: Which is what they failed to do, according to your book, in 1973.
[00:38:21] Speaker A: So and so he came a dozen years after the 73 war. He came in the mid eighties and he was arrested in 85.
So his sister had contacted me and asked me to come out with my story that it could support him. And after studying it, because, as I said, at first, why would I support him? But after studying and seeing that he actually behaved courageously and correctly as an American, why do I say as an American, because of the Nuremberg judgments. The Nuremberg judgment said that the german soldier who was just following your orders, that's no excuse. If you're engaged in an act of inhumanity against man, you have to refuse to follow orders according to the Nuremberg judgments. And they held the German responsible even though the Nuremberg judgments didn't exist before Nuremberg. In 19, 45, 46.
So in 1946, the Allies imposed the Nuremberg trials on the Germans and Austrians in Nuremberg. And the judgments said that no german soldier could escape guilt by claiming that he was just following your orders. That if you were ordered to engage in some act of inhumanity to man, it's your responsibility to refuse those orders. Now, this was retroactive.
The Nuremberg judgments didn't exist before the war. They came into being after the war. Yet the Germans were still found responsible after the war. We're talking about 1985. Now, when Jonathan Pollard passed information that he understood was vital to America's allies, in which if the information wasn't passed, innocent civilians would be harmed, this would be an act of inhumanity to Mandev. And his supervisors weren't doing that.
In fact, they were laughing that those Israelis, those Jews, they have a sensitivity to gas. Things like that. You could read in Bernard Henderson's book all of these jew baiting things that they did to Jonathan Pollard. So Jonathan Pollard took it upon himself to do what his supervisors should have been doing.
They should have been prosecuted under the Nuremberg judgments. And Jonathan Pollard should have been recognized as an american hero.
[00:41:48] Speaker C: Wow. That is an interesting take. Have you met him since he came back to Israel?
[00:41:53] Speaker A: I have met him a couple of times.
[00:41:55] Speaker C: Okay. Oh, wow. Well, I mean, if any of this comes out, if anything similar or parallel occurred with. In October 7, 2023, with any sort of withholding of intelligence, there were, like, more than 1200 civilians killed on October 7. So whereas the Yom Kippur war, it was the army that took the israeli army that took the bulk of the casualties. This time it was civilians plus hostages. 250 hostages, some of whom aren't even Israeli, that were taken. 120 as of this date that are still being held. Not all of them alive. So that's going to.
[00:42:49] Speaker A: The 1973 Yom Kippur war was traumatic for Israelis.
It was a national trauma. And they said there would never be a trauma that would equal that trauma of 50 years ago. But October 7, unfortunately, surpassed that trauma. Israel suffered a trauma that surpassed the trauma of the Yom Kippur war. The Yom Kippur war, as you rightly said, over 2600 Israelis were killed. But they were military this time. You said 1200 Israelis were murdered.
You left out an advert. They were brutally murdered.
It was atrocious.
[00:43:49] Speaker C: Yeah. October 7 was quite unprecedented in its brutality.
And the scale, I don't think anybody expected the scale of, you know, you're not talking about where, you know, five different armies bearing down on Israel. You're talking about one terrorist organization that has. Has been armed, but not, not a state that has an army.
[00:44:18] Speaker A: So I'll give you another fact that I don't think most people realize.
The Biden administration warned Israel, and to quote Joe Biden, the israeli army shouldn't go into Haifa.
He meant Rafa, he said. But that's apart from this. Why was he so insistent that the IDF don't go into Rafa?
In fact, he said, and this is another clue, that what happened 50 years ago might have been a repeat in October 7, that they said that they have intelligence of where the hostages are being held and they'll share it with the Israelis if they don't go into Rafa.
Why are you withholding intelligence from an ally? It kind of smells similar to what happened 50 years ago. What did they discover when they went into Rafa? That there were over 50 tunnels, many of them big enough that supply trucks could go through. Now, I'll give you another little example, and we, all of us, have to put our little pieces of information together and compile them to see the whole story. I met a man, a soldier, an American, who was in the army, active for six years, was stationed in the Sinai as part of a contingent, an american contingent to monitor military transportation across the Sinai.
And instead of doing that, he was part of the reconnaissance group. Instead of doing that, he was reassigned to be a lifeguard in Sharma Shek. And he says, wow, this is cushy.
He loved the idea of not having to monitor military transports across the Sinai and to sit and watch people bathing and be a lifeguard.
[00:46:38] Speaker C: When was he reassigned?
[00:46:40] Speaker A: This was in 2002. It was before Hamas even took charge. But if it was happening then, then I see that it could have been continuing into the time that Hamas was in charge of Gaza. It could very well be. How do we know? It should be investigated. And it kind of supports the idea that all the arms, many of them were american arms that got into Gaza had to have come through Egypt and through Rafa.
[00:47:19] Speaker C: Right.
[00:47:20] Speaker A: They had to have. It's like. It's like a door.
[00:47:24] Speaker C: Well, didn't they say that some of the tunnels from Rapha do extend into Egypt?
[00:47:31] Speaker A: Say it again.
[00:47:32] Speaker C: The tunnels from Raphae, don't some of them extend into Egypt?
[00:47:38] Speaker A: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Along the egyptian border?
[00:47:43] Speaker C: Yeah, yeah. So they, they definitely, I mean, they're obviously, they're getting it from somewhere, and it's not most likely coming through Israel. Although, although I do have a question about that. You've lived in Israel long enough now, and some people are saying, and especially now, in light of these attacks and even before, they were talking about a deep state in Israel, and I don't know if you see any evidence of that, especially regarding the October 7 attacks, that perhaps a deep state was playing a part here in Israel.
[00:48:25] Speaker A: Well, I'm not the right person to interview on that question because I hear what we call Shmuel, you know, rumors, conspiracy theories, second and third and fourth hand, and I hear lots of them, but I'm not a prime source to interview about that.
[00:48:46] Speaker C: Okay. Okay. Okay.
Well, listen, Israel is, since the attacks, and I actually, we could say before the attacks, because if you remember, the biggest protest before the attacks had to do with the proposed judicial reform that was going through the government. And Israel was very divided. And then suddenly, the Israelis united from October 7 for a couple months, and now, yet again, we're nine months out. Israel is again extremely divided. You've got the families of the hostages protesting every day. You've got the anti Netanyahu element has also crept into the protests again, like from before October 7. And there's protests every day. There's different, always many opinions in Israel, but this time, life or death opinions, how to get the hostages out, how to end the war, what to do. Everybody's got their own take on it.
Tell me if Israel has to go it alone, if Israel can't rely on allies, what can Israel do? What's the future for Israel relying on itself?
And what can they draw from to see to defend itself in the future?
Intelligence breakdowns happen from the outside, and you've got the problems from the inside. What is it Israel has to do?
[00:50:28] Speaker A: I think it's a spiritual war. It's a religious war. And I, over the past years, the past half dozen years, I've been interfacing with local Arabs what the media calls West Bank Arabs, because I live in Judea.
The media calls us the West bank, but Judea means the land of the Jews.
But although it means the land of the Jews, and historically and traditionally and biblically, Judea is the land of the Jews, we're in reality, we're a minority. We are jewish islands in an arab sea.
And I interface with the Arabs and many people in the west, many of the leftists particularly, they see what they call the settlements, jewish communities in Judea, the land of the Jews, as obstacles to peace.
And I see us as bridges to peace because we interface with the local Arabs on a daily basis. I spend 9 hours a day with a group of arab workers that Israel security requires that they have an Israeli with a gun to be with them, not to protect them, and not to protect Israelis, because most of them are fine people. There hasn't been, at the risk of opening my mouth to the devil, there hasn't been an instance that I'm aware of where any of the arab workers that build these jewish communities, that actually get their hands dirty and do the backbreaking work to build houses and public institutions, would attack a jew.
It's almost unheard of. So therefore, I believe that we could be bridges to peace and not obstacles to peace. So that's a total on your head understanding.
Also, I think that a very important thing is the Temple Mount.
We Jews returned to our land and we are not settlers, we are resettlers, because we're resettling places that were Hebrew.
Our obligation was to rebuild our temple. On the Temple Mount, this latest horrible tragedy, it has a name, it's called Al Aqsa Flood.
Al Aqsa is the Temple Mount.
All the way back, starting in 1929, the 1929 riots where there was a terrible massacre in the jewish community of Hebron came about because of rumors about the Jews taking over the Temple Mount. So the Temple Mount is the focus.
It's the incendiary point in this whole thing.
And I really believe, and I'm going to admit this in public because I tried to do this quietly. I contacted the Waq. This is the muslim religious council that are in charge of the temple Mount and other holy sites.
I contacted a senior member, if not the senior member, he's in his eighties, if I can remember his name. Mahdi Abu al Khadi, I believe that's his name.
Doctor Mahdi Abdul Hadi. And I said, doctor Abdul Hadi.
I. Nobody, you don't need to mention my name. You should be the initiator of getting the members of the Waq to come out and invite the Jews to rebuild their third temple, Solomon's temple.
This would create peace. This would really create. It would do more to create peace than any peace conference or any peace protests that you can imagine.
But he was, we say in Hebrew, he was closed focused and closed minded.
[00:55:34] Speaker C: Yeah.
[00:55:37] Speaker A: Unfortunately, in 1967, when the Jews took over the temple Mount, there was somebody who gave the keys to the temple Mount, to the Waq. And I don't know who that individual is, but if I find out, I'll.
[00:55:55] Speaker C: Knock out his other eye veiled reference there. I won't say anything.
[00:56:00] Speaker A: It was Moshe Dayan.
[00:56:03] Speaker C: Yeah.
Wow. But that's really fascinating. And I mean, I really love how you said bridge is to peace. I think that this is, it's a slow road, but possibly the only one to peace here in the Middle east. And as far as your temple Mount theory, I think you've got books too. But listen, I highly recommend to get deceit of an ally. I think this is, I'm reading it right now. And one thing I love is also all the mentions in the Jerusalem Post and all the other israeli media. Yadi Ozonod, you can get it in English or Hebrew. Can you get it, I assume on Amazon. And I can put, put links obviously in the show notes, but there's so much more information that we didn't even touch the surface. And I appreciate your verification of the facts that you do put forth. So I think people would be very interested in getting to, getting more details in your books. So, and we have, we would have a lot more to talk about, I can tell you that much. So thank you, Bruce, this has been great. Thank you very much for joining me today.
[00:57:20] Speaker A: Thank you for having me and being part of getting the truth out.
[00:57:31] Speaker B: Thank you so much for tuning in today. I really believe it's so important to understand the complexities here in the Middle east, especially as the times get way more complicated. So if you want more inside scoops like this from Jerusalem, please subscribe to this channel.
[00:57:52] Speaker C: Please give us a like and share with your friends.
[00:57:56] Speaker B: Thank you so much for tuning in. And as always, this is the inside scoop. Jerusalem.
